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ICS Reg

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

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D/ICS-85-7609
31 January 1985


LOGGED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees

FROM:


Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Final Minutes of Fifteenth IG/CM Meeting,
10 January 1985

Attached are final minutes of the fifteenth IG/CM meeting held on 10
January 1985. 

Attachment:
a/s

Regraded Unclassified when separated
from classified attachment.

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SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING

10 January 1985

Room 6W02, [REDACTED]

1. The fifteenth meeting of the IG/CM was convened at 1400 hours, 10 January 1985, by Chairman (DUSD-Policy) General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.). A list of individuals attending is at Attachment 1. [REDACTED]

2. The Chairman made the following opening remarks: [REDACTED]

a. After two and one-half years of briefings, orientations, and coordination at various governmental levels, DoD has finally been able to promulgate a revision of its polygraph directive. It provides for the conduct of the "test" of a CI polygraph program focused on specifically designated special access programs and some critical positions as designated by the Director, DIA. A detailed regulation as to how the DoD polygraph program will work was published on 7 January 1985. [REDACTED]

b. In October 1984, the special panel appointed by the Chairman, as DUSD-Policy, completed its examination of the effectiveness of the Defense Industrial Security Program in light of lessons learned from the Harper case. Approximately 25 issues were explored and recommendations made. DoD has begun acting on these recommendations, some of which are cost intensive. Interested agencies may obtain a copy of the study from Mr. L. Britt Snider, OSD. [REDACTED]

c. A companion instruction to the DoD directive permitting the withholding from public disclosure that technical data subject to export controls has recently been published. The new instruction prescribes policies and procedures for the appropriate marking of relevant documents. DoD will conduct special training sessions at 24 locations on the new system. The new guidance, in toto, marks a milestone in efforts to stem the flow of militarily relevant data to our adversaries. [REDACTED]

d. The Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Operations Committee will begin hearings in late February on personnel security, focusing on personnel security within Defense. [REDACTED]

e. The National Operations Security Advisory Committee (NOAC) is prepared to brief the SIG-I, as requested, on security aspects pertaining to the US Geological Survey's National High Altitude Photography Program. The briefing will take place in mid January. [REDACTED]

2. The scheduled agenda items were introduced and discussed with the following results:

a. Macro Resources Data Study: [REDACTED] Study Director, provided a summary of the study background, its methodology, content, results, and conclusions. The proposed conclusions were that:

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currently available countermeasures resource data are too soft for comprehensive countermeasures resource management; individual departments and agencies see little benefit and major problems in setting up a central countermeasures resource management structure; the bulk of countermeasures programs are largely in DoD; and the most practical IG/CM course is to encourage individual departments/agencies to use the study as a basis for improvement-targeted reviews of their countermeasures resource management systems/procedures, especially where large sums are involved. []

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The Chairman observed that the study is an important and valuable contribution which will allow the Community to know roughly how much money is being spent on our countermeasure programs and therefore provide various perspectives not seen before from a macro point of view. He cautioned that overall, the key criterion is not the fact of how much is spent but how effective are the results. He indicated the latter must be determined by individual agencies. The Chairman extended his compliments, on behalf of the IG/CM membership, to [] for an excellent job on a very difficult task. []

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ACTION: The IG/CM, having no further comment, gave its endorsement to the study. The Chairman expressed the IG/CM consensus that the Secretariat should transmit the study to the SIG-I for its information and review, and indicate that the IG/CM will continue to monitor the actions taken in the resource area. []

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b. Operations Security Issues: The Secretariat introduced three items on which the Chairman, NOAC, wanted IG/CM comment. The first was a proposed National Operations Security Program which had been developed by the NOAC and approved for action. The IG/CM Secretary explained that the NOAC has proceeded toward accomplishing several of the objectives outlined in the program and, absent IG/CM objection, intended to use the program as a guide to future NOAC actions. The second item concerned a set of NOAC-developed and -approved training objectives for a three-level national program of instruction in operations security. The three levels concerned courses of instruction tailored for executives (approximately a four-hour course), for project/program managers (approximately a four-day course), and for operations security specialists (approximately a one-week course). The third item concerned a NOAC recommendation that NSA serve as the lead agency for development and presentation of the three national-level courses of instruction in operations security. The Secretary explained that NSA had indicated preliminary willingness to assume the lead role with the proviso that the Community provide requisite support when needed. []

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ACTION: The Chairman, expressing the IG/CM consensus, indicated that the IG/CM has noted the NOAC promulgation of a national OPSEC program; noted and supported the training objectives for three appropriate sub-courses of OPSEC instruction at the national level; and

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endorsed the role of NSA as the lead agency for the development and presentation of national-level OPSEC instruction, subject to support as needed. The NOAC should proceed with implementing actions. []

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c. Supercomputer Threat and Countermeasures: []

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NSA, indicated NSA concern over indications of an increasing effort by foreign countries, especially the Soviets, to gain access to supercomputers. He advised that within two weeks IG/CM members should receive an NSA publication which details the threat to supercomputers. He asked for the full support of the individual agencies represented on the IG/CM in the development of and adherence to various countermeasures to reduce/eliminate the threat. To provide an information overview of the scope of the threat and of countermeasures being developed, he introduced Mr. Vincent F. DeCain, Commerce, who is also a member of the SIG-Technology Transfer (SIG-TT). Mr. DeCain emphasized the fact that computers were revolutionizing warfare. He observed that supercomputers permit advances not otherwise obtainable in that they provide greater accuracy and provide for a wide range of interactivity. He outlined some uses of supercomputers and revealed that the Soviets have encountered great difficulties in developing supercomputers for themselves. As a consequence, they continue trying to access our supercomputers, in part to work selected problems and also to gain functional information about them for transfer to the USSR development effort. Mr. DeCain indicated that only the US and Japan presently manufacture supercomputers, but he cautioned that it was only a matter of time before the Soviets acquired the requisite skills and techniques. He reported that in an attempt to safeguard the special technology associated with supercomputers, the US and Japan have entered into a joint security protocol and he described the details of the protocol. He also elaborated on other international safeguards which are being applied to both the importing and exporting governments. Mr. DeCain then outlined some of the domestic safeguard considerations and related them to the variety of existing countermeasures applied in the security and proprietary arenas. He emphasized that safeguards relating to computer use/access in academia (universities) is presently a weak link. He mentioned efforts are under way to develop, with the cooperation of universities, a protocol for basic security procedures and standards. Mr. DeCain concluded his presentation by describing example national solutions, of varying effectiveness, to a few of the most notable computer security problems. He appealed to IG/CM agencies to vigorously support these solutions and to advocate for the Community appropriate countermeasures which would thwart the unwanted transfer of computer technology. []

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ACTION: None. The Chairman thanked Mr. DeCain for an insightful information briefing. []

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3. The Chairman inquired about the status of the leak legislation project led by the Department of Justice. Ms. Mary Lawton, DoJ, advised that DoJ had held up further action pending the results of a leak problem options paper which the DCI was to provide to the President. []

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4. The Chairman asked Ms. Lawton about the status of the personnel security options paper prepared in response to NSDD-84 and subsequently provided to the NSC. Ms. Lawton advised that after the SIG-I endorsement of the paper, it had been forwarded to the NSC on 8 June 1984. No follow-on guidance has been received from the NSC to date.

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5. General Stilwell alerted attendees to his imminent retirement plans and to the possibility that this may be the last meeting of the IG/CM which he would chair. Against that contingency, he took the opportunity to thank attendees for their support over the past several years and congratulated all for being dedicated professionals.

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5. The meeting adjourned at 1520 hours.

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Attachment 1

ATTENDEES

IG/CM Meeting, 10 January 1985
Room 1S06,

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NAME

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Air Force
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Distribution of Final Minutes of Fifteenth IG/CM Meeting (D/ICS-85-7609)
(w/atts as shown):

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